Abstract In this paper we use experimental data from rural Cameroon to quantify the effect of social distance on trust and altruism. Our measure of social distance is relevant to everyday economic interactions: subjects in a Trust Game play with fellow villagers or with someone from a different village. We find that significantly more money is sent when the players are from the same village.
Game, and analyze the extent to which generosity and risk aversion decrease with social distance. Using a demographic survey, we test whether personal characteristics explain some of the variation in experimental behavior.
Conditional on some assumptions about the structure of participants' preferences, our empirical results indicate that villagers are both more trusting of and more generous towards those from their own village than those from another village. However, levels of trust and generosity towards the other village are still quite high, even though most people have relatively little contact with the other village. Levels of education and membership of informal credit associations are also significant factors explaining participants' choices. However, we find no correlation between Trust Game transfers and attitudes towards risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the Trust Game, focusing on studies which analyze how trust diminishes with social distance. Section 3 provides some background information on the villages where the field work was conducted, and provides details of our experimental methodology. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
The Trust Game was introduced into the experimental economics literature by Berg et al. (1995) . Since then it has been conducted in a number of countries to test various hypotheses about the determinants of trust and the effects of trust on other variables. Readers interested in a detailed review of results from the Trust Game are referred to Chaudhuri (2009) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) . In reviewing the past literature on the Trust Game, we restrict our focus to studies that have used the Trust Game to measure the extent to which the amounts sent and returned diminish with the degree of social distance between players.
A small number of studies in the literature use an inter-country design in which some university students are paired with students from their own university, while others are paired with students from a university in a different country (Netzer and Sutter, 2009; Willinger et al., 2003; Walkowitz et al., 2003) .
In general, these studies show little or no evidence of a social distance effect, in that the behavior of Senders and Recipients in the Trust Game does not depend on whether a player is paired with someone from their own country or with someone from another country.
1
A similar methodology is used by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) , who play the Trust Game in Israel with two ethnic groups: Ashkenazic Jews and Eastern Jews. Some participants are paired with someone from their own ethnic group, and others are paired with someone from the other ethnic group. The average amount of money sent to Ashkenazic players is significantly higher than that sent to Eastern players, irrespective of the ethnicity of the Sender. This indicates an ethnicity effect rather than a social distance effect. Separate groups of players also take part in a Triple Dictator Game. There is little evidence of a correlation between the size of the Triple Dictator Game donations and the ethnicity of the Recipient.
There are a handful of studies which find common membership of a certain type of group to increase experimental trust (Karlan, 2005; Etang et al., 2007; Cadsby et al., 2008) . These can be interpreted in terms of a social distance effect, but with the caveat that group membership could be a treatment effect (joining the group leads people to trust each other) or a selection effect (people who trust each other join the group).
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In order to rule out the possibility of a selection effect and ensure that common group membership is a genuine treatment, Buchan et al. (2006) , randomly assign people to artificially created groups. This follows the Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) approach commonly used in social psychology (for example Tajfel, 1970) , which suggests that people are more likely to favor those from their own group, even if the groups have been artificially created by random 1 Although theirs is not an experimental paper, Guiso et al. (2009) present survey data showing that among European managers there is a home country bias: managers from any given country express more trust in people from that country than do managers from other European countries.
2 A few studies have examined whether the number of voluntary organizations someone belongs to is positively correlated with the amount sent or returned in the Trust Game. For example, Mosley and Verschoor (2005) find that group membership is positively correlated with both the amount sent and the amount returned in the Trust Game in rural Uganda. However, Ashraf et al. (2006) (Russian, South African and US data), Carter and Castillo (2003) These studies do not compare intra-group transfers with inter-group transfers, so they do not address questions about social distance directly. assignment. Buchan et al. use a sample of university students in China, Japan, Korea and the United States. Although this study involves students from different countries, students only play against those from their own country. Before playing the Trust Game, participants spend ten minutes in groups introducing themselves to each other. When the Trust Game is played, participants are told if they are playing against someone from their discussion group (the in-group) or someone from a different group (the out-group). The effect of this experimentally generated social distance on behavior differs by country. Americans send (and return) more money to in-group members, but Chinese students send (and return) more to outgroup members; social distance has little effect on behavior in Japan and Korea. Buchan and Croson (2004) take a novel approach to measuring the effects of social distance on trust using both a Trust Game and survey data with a sample of students from China and the United States. As in Buchan et al. (2006) , participants first play a standard Trust Game against someone from their own university. After the Senders have made their transfers, but before they find out how much money they have received back, they complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire asks, hypothetically, how much money they would send (or return if they are a Recipient in the game) if they were to play the game against seven different types of player with varying degrees of social distance: a parent, a sibling, a cousin, a student they know well, a student from another university, a stranger from their home town and a stranger from another country. In both the United States and China, the hypothetical amounts sent and returned tend to fall as social distance increases. The benefit of this approach is that data are obtained for many different points on the radius of trust without having to play the game more than once with each player. However, the data are essentially survey-based rather than experimental, since participants do not actually play the Trust Game against all of the different groups.
Another way to measure the effect of social distance on trust is to let players know the identity of the person with whom they are paired. This enables researchers to test whether the amount of social distance between players is correlated with how they play the Trust Game. However, the loss of anonymity does mean that players' decisions may be influenced by the fear of reprisal if they do not play according to their partner's expectations. Glaeser et al. (2000) use this approach with Harvard undergraduates, and find some evidence of a social distance effect (for example, the amount sent and proportion returned both increase with the number of months the players have known each other).
With the exception of Karlan (2005) and Etang et al. (2007) , all of the studies summarized above have been conducted on university students, who may not be representative of the rest of the population. Very often, the students are paired with people with whom they could not reasonably expect to have a realworld economic transaction. Inter-country studies are potentially relevant to important international social and political questions, but are more difficult to relate directly to a specific economic context. Although some studies have analyzed whether people are less trusting of those from other countries or ethnic groups, the only anonymized experimental study analyzing the effect of social distance among people of the same nationality and ethnic group that we are aware of is Cadsby et al. (2008) , who used Chinese university students as their subject pool. Some studies do use participants drawn from different villages in developing countries, but we know of no cases in which some participants play against fellow villagers and others play against those from a different village. Transfers by Senders in the Trust Game are normally interpreted as a measure of trust, where trust is defined as an expectation of reciprocity from the Recipient. However, the amount of money sent in the Trust Game could be influenced by at least two other factors. The first is altruism: the Sender's utility is a positive function of the Recipient's consumption. The second is risk aversion; this possibility is explicitly acknowledged (but not tested) by Cadsby et al. (2008) , and Buchan et al. (2006) , who refer to the Trust Game by its original name, the "Investment Game", interpreting the results as being informative about "other regarding preferences". Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) test whether altruism is important by playing a Triple Dictator Game as well as a Trust Game.
Experimental design
Our paper explores whether trust and reciprocity decline as social distance increases from interaction with fellow villagers (the in-group) to interaction with people from a neighboring village (the out-group). There is very little geographic 7 mobility between the two villages, so participants are effectively randomly assigned to a village. Our principal experimental tool is the Trust Game, using a between-subjects design. Our sample of Cameroonian villagers differs greatly from those used in previous studies on trust and social distance, nearly all of which rely on university students. In addition, we use a Triple Dictator Game and a Risk Game to explore the possibility that the Senders in our Trust Game (the A Players) are at least partly motivated by altruism and risk aversion. The amount returned in the Trust Game could also depend on altruism (but not on risk, since the Recipient already knows what the Sender's decision is). Therefore, Recipients in our Trust Game (the B Players) also play a Standard Dictator Game.
The Triple Dictator Game is identical to the first phase of the Trust Game, in that the Sender is given an endowment and told that the amount transferred to the Recipient will be tripled. However, the Recipient cannot return any money to the Sender, which rules out trust as a motive for sending money. If Senders transfer any money in this game, it is due to altruism. Previous studies in which Senders have played both a Trust Game and a Triple Dictator Game include Ashraf et al. (2006) and Cox (2004) . In the Standard Dictator Game, the amount sent is not tripled. For a Player B, this game will provide information on the extent to which transfers back to Player A in the Trust Game (which are not multiplied by the experimenter) are motivated by unconditional kindness.
Our Risk Game, played by A Players only, is based on Schechter (2007) , who conducts both a Trust Game and a Risk Game (but not a Triple Dictator Game) in rural Paraguay. In our study, each Player A is given the option of investing all, some or none of an initial endowment in a hypothetical risky project, the payoff from which is determined by the roll of a die. If the experimenter rolls a one then the player loses her investment; if a two is rolled then the Player receives back half of the money invested; if a three is rolled then the player receives the amount invested; if a four is rolled then the payoff is 1.5 times the amount invested; if a five is rolled then the payoff is double the investment; if a six is rolled then the payoff is three times the investment. Any money not invested is kept by the player. The maximum and minimum possible returns are therefore the same as for the Trust Game. In some respects, the social distance between the villages is smaller than the distance between groups used in previous studies: people in our villages all belong to the same ethno-linguistic group; they are all Christian and share common by-laws and customs. As shown in Table 1 below, only a few participants had friends or family in the other village, but all participants had visited the other village at least once in their life. For this reason, we should not expect our treatment effect to be enormous. Nevertheless, social ties within each village are particularly strong, reinforced by church attendance, reciprocal help with harvests, intermarriage, and by-laws enforcing co-operation in community development projects such as road improvement. These ties create a village ingroup typical of many parts of the developing world. The development of a market economy is likely to depend on the extent to which trust falls when people from different villages meet at the market (Kumar and Matsusaka, 2006) .
The sequencing of our experiments is summarized in Table 2 . Participants were recruited at meetings in each of the two small villages. Those who agreed to participate were told a day and a time to turn up to take part in the experiments. A total of 280 people participated in the study, with 140 from each village. The demographic characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1 . The sample is made up of roughly equal numbers of men and women; the average age of participants is just over 40 years. This is substantially greater than the average age 9 in the village, because we only permitted adults to take part in the experiments.
The vast majority of the sample (88%) are married. [ Tables 1-2 
about here]
The data also show that most people have limited contact with the other village.
The average number of friends or relatives a participant has in the other village is 0.3, so participants playing with someone from the other village knew that the chances of being paired with someone known to them personally were very small.
Only 4% of the participants had ever lived in the other village. Although all participants had visited the other village, 85% rarely went there.
The field work was carried out by one of the authors and two research assistants. 5 Each participant took part in the experiments in their own village, with the experimenter and two research assistants travelling from village to village.
The field work began in Village 1, with the A Players. When the players arrived, they were randomly assigned an ID number, which determined who they were paired with. Each player was told that she was paired with different people for the Trust Game and Triple Dictator Game, and told whether these two people were from the same village or from the other village. Each player was paired either with someone from her own village for both games, or with someone from the other village for both games. The sequencing of the games is potentially important, and is described below. The experimenter explained the rules of the Trust, Dictator and Risk Games to the group verbally, and explained that all payouts would be made in seven days time, when the experimenter would return to the village.
Players were told that their initial endowment for each game was 800 CFA francs.
At the time of experiment, 800 CFA francs was slightly less than US$2 -about half a day's wage for most villagers -and could buy just over 1½ kilos of rice.
Players were permitted to make transfers in 100 CFA franc units, so our experimental data have a discrete distribution. Appendix 1 contains the forms used in the verbal explanation to participants, and outlines the examples used to test participants' understanding during the explanation.
Having explained the rules, the experimenter left for another room. All players were then asked to go in turn to the room occupied by the experimenter, to say how much money they wished to transfer in the Trust Game and the Triple Dictator Game, and how much money they wished to invest in the Risk Game.
Players knew prior to entering the room that they would play all three games, and that they would receive payments for all three games. Half of the participants were first asked how much they wished to transfer in the Trust Game, with the other half being first asked how much they wanted to transfer in the Triple Dictator Game. The experimenter then rolled a die so the player could learn how much money she earned in the Risk Game. However, no payouts were made for any of the games at this point. One research assistant remained in the room with the other players to make sure that they did not discuss how they intended to play the game. The second research assistant waited outside the hall to make sure players did not re-enter the hall after communicating their transfer decisions to the experimenter. After participants had made their decisions in each of the games, they answered a question about how much money they expected to receive back from Player B. They then answered a questionnaire asking about demographic characteristics, as well as a range of questions regarding trust and cooperation.
This phase of the field work took two days. All of the forms used to record the subjects' decisions in these games appear in Appendix 1, as does the questionnaire. These forms were used by the experimenter in the verbal communication with the participants; the forms were completed by the experimenter, not the participants, some of whom were illiterate.
The field work then moved to Village 2, where B Players took on the role of Recipients in the Trust Game and Senders in the Dictator Game. Again, the rules of both games were explained to the participants, who were then asked to join the experimenter one at a time in a separate room. They were asked how much they wanted to transfer in the Dictator Game. They were then told how much money had been transferred to them in the Trust Game, and were asked how much money they wished to return. All B Players played the Dictator Game before being told how much they had received in the Trust Game. In separate sessions in Village 2, the A Players made decisions following the same protocol as with the A Players in Village 1. This phase of the field work took three days.
The experimenter and research assistants then returned to Village 1, where the B Players took part in the experiments. This took one day. For the next seven days the experimenter met with the players who had taken part in the experiments a week previously, and paid them whatever sum of money they had earned from the games. All players were paid for all of the games in which they participated.
Two potential issues with our experimental design require further discussion. The first is that players had to wait seven days to receive their payments, so there may be a concern that their decisions depended on how much they trusted the experimenter. This concern is mitigated by the fact that players did not receive any money, including the money they chose not to transfer, for seven days. Another potential concern is that players had to tell the experimenter how much money they wished to transfer, rather than recording this anonymously.
This may have affected their behavior. Hoffman et al. (1996) had subjects play a Dictator Game under several different experimental protocols, with varying degrees of anonymity between the experimenter and participants, and found that as the degree of anonymity (or social distance) between the experimenter and participants decreases, Dictator Game donations increase. Therefore, we might expect that donations in our Trust and (Triple) Dictator Games would have been lower if a double-blind protocol had been followed. However, written transfers were infeasible because many of the participants were illiterate. The face-to-face nature of the experiment also meant that the experimenter was able to answer any questions the players wanted to ask in private. This face-to-face methodology is typically used in field studies when dealing with players who are illiterate (Barr, 2003; Karlan, 2005; Schechter 2007 ), but we should be cautious when comparing the results of field experiments such as ours with laboratory results. 6 4 Results
Descriptive statistics
In this section we analyze players' behavior in the different games. We present descriptive statistics summarizing the players' decisions, and then discuss the possible interpretation of these statistics. Regression analysis is left to section 4.2.
Throughout the discussion we are interested in two questions: (1) other village is equivalent to trust in strangers. Trust in strangers, at least for this part of rural Africa, and as measured by the Trust Game, is high.
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The behavior of B Players is shown in Figure 2 . No B Player returned less than 33% of the tripled transfer, even if paired with someone from the other village. Therefore, all A Players received back at least as much as they were sent, and the vast majority of A Players were better off as a result of transferring money. In other words, there was a high level of reciprocity. The mean proportion returned across the whole sample was 47%, with a high proportion returning
exactly half of what they were sent. The average for intra-village pairs was 48%;
for inter-village pairs it was 47%. This difference is statistically insignificant.
Although A Players transferred less to players from the other village, B Players were no less reciprocating when paired with someone from the other village.
In the questionnaire, the average amount that the A Players expected to receive back was 46% of the tripled transfer for intra-village pairs and 47% for inter-village pairs, so their mean error was very close to zero. Moreover, the average absolute value of the error as a fraction of the actual amount returned was only 18%; in other words, stated expectations were very accurate, on average.
[Figures 1-2 about here]

Dictator and Risk Game results
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of Triple Dictator Game transfers. The mean transfer across all players was 44%; for intra-village transfers the mean was 46%
and for inter-village transfers it was 41%. This difference in unconditional means is insignificant on the basis of a Mann-Whitney test. The fact that some money was sent in the Triple Dictator Game suggests that the anticipation of reward was not the only motive for sending money in the Trust Game. However, the mean transfer in the Triple Dictator Game is much lower than that in the Trust Game.
The distribution of B Player transfers in the Standard Dictator Game is shown in Figure 4 . The mean transfer was 44% for all players, with a mean of 46% for intra-village transfers and 43% for inter-village transfers. These figures are insignificantly different from each other, and from the corresponding amounts returned in the Trust Game.
The distribution of Risk Game investments is shown in Figure 5 . Our experimental results are explicable by the theoretical model only if we allow expected reciprocity to vary along with the altruism parameter. In this sense, our results can be explained only by differences in both altruism and expected reciprocity across the treatment.
There remains a puzzle: stated expectations of reciprocity (which are quite accurate) do not vary across the treatment. There are two ways to reconcile this result with the observed experimental behavior. Firstly, it is possible that the A Players are not expected utility maximizers; secondly, it is possible that the A Players in the inter-village games are untruthful about their expectations, because they are too embarrassed to say explicitly that they don't really trust people from the other village. Selecting the correct alternative is a subject for future research.
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For the B Players, the mean transfer in the Dictator Game is not much lower than the mean amount returned in the Trust Game. This might suggest that a large proportion of the amount returned in the Trust Game reflects altruism rather than a social norm promoting reciprocity. However, it remains to be seen whether Dictator Game and Trust Game choices are correlated.
Formal econometric analysis
This section, which reports multivariate regression results, has two purposes:
firstly to confirm that the stylized facts about the unconditional means discussed in the previous section are also true of means conditional on players' personal characteristics, and secondly to explore the link between Risk Game / Dictator Game choices and Trust Game choices. We begin with an analysis of the amount sent, the results for which are reported in the first two columns of Table 3 .
Because the dependent variable is both left-and right-censored, and takes discrete values, the Table 3 results are based on a censored interval regression (Long and Freese, 2006) . Broadly speaking, these coefficients can be interpreted in the same way as OLS coefficients. Appendix 3 reports results from an uncensored interval regression. (These are OLS coefficients with t-ratios adjusted for the clustering of errors.) There are no substantial differences between the two sets of results.
The first column shows coefficients from a regression for the amount sent (as a percentage of the initial endowment) on a dummy variable for whether the transfer was to a fellow villager, and on Player A demographic characteristics.
These are characteristics that have been found to be significant in explaining Trust
Game transfers in previous empirical work (for example Schechter, 2007; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2006) . They include age, income, household size, the number of children and number of years lived in the village, and dummies for gender, martial status (never married, divorced, widowed, with married as the omitted category), whether the participant has ever lived in an urban area, and completion of primary education. We also include the number of friends the participant has in the other village and a dummy variable for whether the participant has ever lived in the other village, both interacted with a dummy variable for participants playing with someone from the other village. However, our Appendix 2 model implies that this coefficient is a complex nonlinear combination of both trust and altruism parameters, so we should not read too much into the fact that its estimated value is insignificantly different from one. 13 Finally, the coefficient on the Risk Game investment is positive but insignificant, so there is no evidence that risk aversion, at least as we have measured it, has an impact on Trust Game behavior. This result is in contrast to Schechter (2007) , who finds a significant correlation between Trust Game donations and risk, based on a sample of villagers in Paraguay. Our result is 12 Despite other concerns about stated expectations, this lack of proportionality is consistent with the theoretical model in Appendix 2. Adding an interaction between the same-village dummy and the expected return produces a positive coefficient, suggesting that the expected return is a better indicator of intentions when the transfer is to a fellow villager. However, the interaction term is highly correlated with the dummy (ρ = 0.96), and the standard error is too large for any inference.
consistent with that of Ashraf et al. (2006) and Eckel and Wilson (2004) , but they use a different Risk Game to ours with subjects from industrialized countries.
Note however that the distribution of the amount returned in Cameroon is rather different from the Paraguayan distribution. The means are quite similar (47% and 43%), but all Cameroonians returned between 33% and 62%, whereas the extreme values in Paraguay were 0% and 100%. (Schechter does not report the variance of the distribution.) There was much more risk facing the A Players in Paraguay, and so a better chance of distinguishing between players with different degrees of risk aversion.
The third column of Table 3 The fourth column of Table 3 reports the Triple Dictator Game regression, in which only two coefficients are statistically significant. Players paired with those from the same village sent 4% more than those paired with players from the other village. This effect is the same magnitude as the (insignificant) difference in the unconditional means reported in the previous section, and is consistent with Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree et al. (forthcoming) , who find that Dictator Game donations decrease with social distance for students in the United States. 14 The high precision in the estimate of the regression coefficient is a result of the fact that we condition on a highly significant education variable. Those with a primary education completion certificate send 11% more, on average, than those without.
Those with an education are significantly more generous. (The income coefficient is statistically insignificant, so this effect is not a consequence of a correlation between education and income.)
The fifth column of Table 3 reports the regression results for Dictator
Game transfers by Recipients in the Trust Game. Here, the coefficient on the same-village dummy is statistically insignificant, as was the difference in the unconditional means discussed above. However, the education effect is again significant, though slightly smaller than in the Triple Dictator Game.
The final column in Table 3 reports the results of a regression of the Risk Game investment on personal characteristics. The Risk Game investment appears to be independent of most characteristics, including income and education.
However, controlling for age, people who have lived longer in their village (the stay-at-homes?) are inclined to invest a little less, on average.
Conclusion
The Trust Game measures the extent to which one person will put herself at risk from ungenerous or unreciprocating behavior by another. Such trust is relevant to many everyday transactions in an African village: for example, helping out with someone else's cocoa harvest (when she might not help out with yours), or lending her a bicycle to go to the market (when she might not buy the new cooking pot for you). 15 One of the key aims of this paper is to measure the effect of social distance on such trust by comparing intra-village transfers with intervillage transfers in rural Cameroon. Although ours is not the first study to address the social distance question, it is the first to do so in a poor rural setting. We take experiments from the laboratory, previously used mainly with university students, and replicate them in two African villages. Andreoni and Miller, 2002) . One possible explanation for the small treatment effect is the lack of experimental anonymity. A subject might be unwilling to be seen to send less to someone from another village than (she imagines the experimenter thinks) she would send to a fellow villager.
of trust in people from the neighboring village is still quite high. We also find that The degree of risk aversion, as measured by investments in a Risk Game, is uncorrelated with the amount sent in the Trust Game.
It remains to be seen whether these characteristics of trust are replicated in other parts of Africa, in other regions which are politically stable and free of violent conflict. It also remains to be seen whether the moderate decline in villagers' trust as the radius expands to nearby villages continues at the same rate as the radius expands to the nearest town, and to further towns inhabited by people of other ethnic groups. (The success of experimental tests of such effects depends on the solution of major logistical problems.) It also remains to be seen whether there is any policy variable that can generate more trust in one's neighbor. 
